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Abstract 
The UK Government proposed in February 2020 that sentenced prisoner transfers with EU member 
states should continue after Brexit, but using a more ‘effective’ process than the existing CoE 
convention. The article analyses, with a particular focus on the Irish-UK CTA, the significance of 
continued UK human rights compliance for the achievement of this objective and the 
interrelationship of this issue with extradition/surrender (including the surrender of fugitive 
prisoners). It is concluded that Brexit has most probably raised the level of formal and institutional 
human rights compliance (including legal aid/assistance and the direct enforcement of prisoners’ 
rights in domestic courts) required from the UK for criminal justice cooperation with EU member 
states.  Entering into such undertakings would not assist criminal impunity or the evasion of lawfully 
imposed penalties. Such undertakings, however, cannot help to resolve many problems inherent in 
prisoner transfer within the EU. The creation of a truly effective and rehabilitative transfer system 
would require (a) constructive UK Government participation in inter-governmental (including the UK 
devolved governments)/EU arrangements capable of incrementally resolving or effectively 
mitigating criminal justice cooperation problems and (b) acceptance at Westminster that this aspect 
of post-Brexit readjustment is likely to be intermittent and of long-duration. 
Key words 
Prisoner transfer, prisoners’ rights, ECHR, the Irish-UK Common Travel Area (CTA), intermittent post-
Brexit readjustment 
Introduction  
The author of this article welcomes a UK Government policy objective and its public justification: 
continued access to prisoner transfer with EU member states to assist, in the relevant cases, with 
prisoner rehabilitation and resettlement. He has commented earlier on the importance of retaining 
transfer for foreign women prisoners, especially any with underlying physical and mental health 
problems.1 This is qualified by concerns arising from research indicating that prisoner transfer in the 
EU has ‘a disruptive effect on the retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation functions of 
punishment’.2  The UK Government’s proposal to build and improve on the existing CoE transfer 
 
1 TJ Wilson, ‘Not quite anyone's guess: Brexit, forensic science and legal medicine’ (2019) Journal of Forensic 
and Legal Medicine 61 74. 
2 T. Marguery, ‘Towards the end of mutual trust? Prison conditions in the context of the European Arrest 
Warrant and the transfer of prisoners framework decisions’ (2018) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 25 705 




convention could provide policy development opportunities to remove or mitigate some of the 
dysfunctionality within the current EU arrangements. 
This item on the UK’s future criminal justice cooperation agenda can also be seen as a precautionary 
move. Maintaining effective cross-border criminal justice cooperation, including extradition and 
sentenced prisoner transfer, is critical politically should Brexit damage Northern Ireland’s fragile 
peace.3 Yet such a seemingly pragmatic and constructive objective presents right-wing UK 
governments with an immediate dilemma. The AFSJ (Area of Freedom Security and Justice) model of 
criminal justice cooperation ‘rests on a bundle of rights and obligations from which it is not easy or 
in some cases possible to extricate certain instruments, especially from the outside.’4 This sets clear 
legal parameters for future UK extradition and prisoner transfer cooperation with all EU member 
states, including Ireland. As will be seen, even the use of CoE Convention in its unimproved form 
cannot side-step this EU human rights baseline.  
Past exaggeration (or misrepresentation) of the impact of human rights 5  means that the bundling of 
rights and safeguards into international cooperation arrangements presents a major presentational 
problem for the present or any successor UK Conservative Party government.  Potential concerns 
within its support base could be lowered, however, by publicly recognising the likely modest impact 
of any formal and institutional human rights enforcement obligations required as a direct 
consequence of Brexit. Some human rights advocates also contribute to such misconceptions. 
Imagining ’universal human rights trumping the world of politics, … supervised by powerful courts 
and individual judges à la Dworkin’s Hercules’,6  does not encourage more balanced deliberations. 
In analysing the role and significance of human rights in prisoner transfer, this article reflects on the 
fragility and weakness of human rights in the daily work of the courts and prison administrations. 
This is often disguised by how, when politicians (not only on the right7) dislike a legal outcome, they 
may resort to claims about judges ‘lack of democratic legitimacy and public accountability’ instead of 
acknowledging the real origins of the problem.8  More modest expectations of human rights law are, 
for example and in a way that is relevant to this article, consistent with assessments of the limited 
impact of human rights on Irish penal policies. Conclusions are generally pessimistic.9 Though the 
comparatively recent emergence in Ireland of prison litigation, despite long-standing and objectively 
assessable problems of overcrowding and lack of in cell sanitation’, may be significant in this 
 
3 For the potential impact of Brexit on crime and inter-communal relations in Northern Ireland see G Davies, 
’Facilitating cross-border criminal justice cooperation between the UK and Ireland after Brexit: “Keeping the 
lights on” to ensure the safety of the Common Travel Area’ in this issue. 
4 P. Hustinx, M. Kennedy, S. Carrera, V. Mitsilegas, M. Stefan and Fabio Giuffrida, Criminal Justice and Police 
Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit (Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS): Brussels, 
2018) 12. 
5E.g. O Wright ‘Clarke’s attack on “childlike” comments fuels rift with May’ and A McSmith ‘Moggygate has 
highlighted a loss of honour in politics’ The Independent 7 October 2011 2. 
6 P Agha, ‘Introduction’ in P Agha (ed) Human Rights Between law and Politics  (Hart, Oxford 2017) 5  
7 E.g. T Blair, A Journey (Hutchinson, London 2010) 205: liberal minded judges, the ECHR ‘with its absolutist 
attitude to the prospect of returning someone to an unsafe community ….’ and the UN Refugee Convention 
made it ‘the Devil’s own job to return [asylum seekers]’. 
8 D Feldman, ‘Democracy, Law and Human Rights: Politics as Challenge and Opportunity’ in M Hunt, HJ Hooper 
and P Yowell (eds) Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart, Oxford 2017) 96-98. 
9 C. Hamilton, ‘Europe in Irish Prisons: Not Quite the Good European’ in T. Daems and L. Roberts (eds.) Europe 
in Prisons (Palgrave Macmillan: Cham, 2017) 208. 




respect.10 Elsewhere in common law jurisdictions, a similar recognition of the limitations of judicial 
intervention can be seen in American studies. These focus instead on the damaging misconceptions 
in political discourse about penal issues and the need for the political reform of both penal policies 
and prosecution decision making.11 
The approach to human rights in this article, therefore, does not only look at the relevant law. It is 
also concerned with the politics of or discourse about human rights together with the organisational 
structures for building (necessarily incrementally) and improving on existing transfer instruments. It 
begins by examining the future EU-wide context for prisoner transfer with which Irish-UK 
arrangements – irrespective of whether the Article 50 process ends with a treaty – must be 
compliant. The second section looks at prisoner transfers within the Common Travel Area (CTA) in 
terms of its origins, current state and future options. The third section analyses the general 
approach of the courts - in terms of self-imposed high bars to impeding extradition/transfer and the 
margin of appreciation (ECtHR)/discretion (CJEU) – that restrict intervention. The fourth section 
examines human rights case law arising from prison conditions and prisoner treatment. That section 
is not a detailed commentary on the issues that may arise in an individual case or legislative/treaty 
review. Instead it suggests how understanding the principles and trends discernible in the relevant 
case law might (a) counter political misrepresentations about the interrelationship of human 
rights/’judicial activism’, criminal justice cooperation and Brexit, especially the potentially limited 
impact of human rights challenges, and (b) assist with the identification of the human rights issues 
that can only be addressed by policy development work on reformed transfer arrangements.  
There is inevitably some overlap with Davies and Arnell’s article in this issue. They examine the 
history of extradition within the CTA and identify the policy options through which this could 
continue after Brexit. 12  This article, irrespective of the structure of the extradition process, seeks to 
encourage political, professional and academic deliberations about prison conditions and prisoner 
treatment issues arising from international in-custody transfers. The aim of the deliberations would 
be to contribute to the development of an efficient transfer process with effective human rights 
safeguards.   
The EU-wide context for post-Brexit prisoner transfers  
UK-EU member state extradition has been highly dependent on EU criminal justice cooperation and 
is a significant area of specialist legal activity, with, for example, 25 individuals surrendered from 
 
10 M Rogan, ‘Judicial conception of prisoners' right in Ireland: an emerging field’ (Academy of 
European Law, 'Improving Conditions Related to Detention', Council of Europe, Strasbourg, November 6-7. 
2014) 3. < https://arrow.tudublin.ie/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=aaschlawcon > accessed 24 
July 2020. 
11E.g. J F Pfaff Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform (Basic Books, 
New York 2017) and E Bazelon, Charged: the New Movement to Transform American Prosecution and End 
Mass Incarceration (Random House, New York 2020)..  
12 G Davies and P Arnell, ‘Extradition between the UK and Ireland after Brexit – Understanding the past and 
present to prepare for the future’. 




Ireland to the UK in 2017 and 28 travelling in the opposite direction.13  Sentenced prisoner transfer 
data is less reliable, but appears to involve a similar number of individuals.14  
UK politicians value the EU way of doing extradition - MLR (mutual legal recognition) surrender (like 
many other measures in the AFJS acquis) - for its efficiency.15 This applies to many aspects of the 
AFSJ acquis, with it being noted in The Law Society Gazette that the UK was ‘opting into as much as 
possible in the hope of seamless criminal cooperation after [leaving]’, with the membership of four 
additional or revised criminal justice cooperation measures just before or after the UK would have 
left the European Union under the original Article 50 timetable.16  
The UK relationship with the AFJS acquis has tended to be instrumental: ‘We do not want to be part 
of a European justice system, but we do want to be part of the fight against international crime’.17 
Having helped to shape the MLR approach that underlies how many of the legal instruments 
operate,18 the UK19 (also Ireland20) secured rights in the Lisbon Treaty, to cherry pick:  
[The] … exceptional status for the UK allowed it to benefit from a totally unusual pick and 
choose capacity, leading to risks of deep imbalances for the European criminal justice area.  
…Allowing some Member States to avoid a part of the acquis brings with it the risk of ending 
up with serious imbalances, compromising the establishment of a genuine European 
criminal justice area.21 
 
13 Of 479 cases scheduled for an extradition hearing in Westminster Magistrates’ Court over three months 
from 17 March 2015, all but 18 (3.8%) requests originated from EU Member States, Polish Judicial Authorities v 
Celinski and other cases [2015] EWHC 1274 (Admin) [1]. More recent data suggests that non-EU extradition 
requests average less than 100 a year, equivalent to about 0.6% - 0.9% of the EAW request total, Home Office, 
Impact Assessment: Extradition Provisional Arrest Power (Home Office, London, 2020) paras 19 and 24. The 
Irish-UK data is taken from National Crime Agency, European Arrest Warrants: Wanted by the UK (part 1), 
calendar year to 2017 and European Arrest Warrants: Wanted by the UK (part3), calendar year to 2017, both 
published 16 September 2018 <https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-
are/publications?search=wanted+by+the+uk&category%5B%5D=4&limit=20&tag=&tag= > accessed 1 June 
2020. 
14 At 30 March 2013 there were 4,058 EU nationals in UK prisons and it was estimated that about 1,400 of 
these prisoners were eligible for transfer. At that time no EU prisoners had been transferred out of the UK on a 
voluntary basis and only four compulsory transfers had been completed: Justice Committee, Ministry of Justice 
measures in the JHA block opt-out (HC 2013–14 605) paras 31-32. The UK government stated later that some 
357 prisoners had left England and Wales for EU Member States and 100 had been received into this 
jurisdiction. The data did not distinguish between voluntary and non-consensual transfer or between reliance 
on EU or CoE instruments. It indicated, contrary to the facts apparent from two Irish cases cited in the next 
section, that no transfers had taken place between England and Wales (hereafter England) and Ireland, HC 
Deb, 18 February 2019 WA 357.  
15 See for example, Justice Committee, Implications of Brexit for the justice system (HC 2016–17 750). 
16 J. Goldsmith, ‘UK opts into several EU criminal measures just before Brexit’, Law Society Gazette,23 April 
2019 <https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/commentary-and-opinion/uk-opts-into-several-eu-criminal-measures-
just-before-brexit/5070030.article> on 15 June 2020. 
17 Former Lord Chancellor Grayling quoted in Justice Committee (n17) para 20. 
18 See J.R. Spencer, ‘The UK and EU Criminal Law: Should we be Leading, Following or Abstaining? ‘in V. 
Mitsilegas, P. Alldridge and L. Cheliotis (eds) Globalisation, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (Hart, Oxford 
2017) 139-140. 
19 TFEU, Protocols 19, 21 and 36. 
20 Ibid, Protocols 19 and 21. 
21 A. Weyembergh, ‘Consequences of Brexit for European Union criminal law’ (2017) 8 New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 284-299.  




This is justifiable criticism, especially over the UK and Irish rejection of access to legal aid/ assistance 
(see Table 2).22   
Such views gloss over, as noted earlier (and to be considered in the next section), systemic problems 
within the acquis itself. They also overlook the organisational skills and innovative thinking UK 
experts brought to acquis development. 23 This resulted in considerable mutual respect. The 
strength, consistency and Parliamentary impact of the professional and academic championing of 
the AFJS measures is reflected in the academic literature24 and Parliamentary reports.25 The ‘peculiar 
saga’ by which Denmark was legally enabled to remain part of Europol, in spite of the fact that a 
national referendum specifically decided it would not, is a reminder perhaps that ‘where there is a 
will it seems there may be well be a way’26 to prevent all access to cooperation being lost because of 
Brexit. It should certainly provide good foundations for UK criminal justice professionals to engage 
with EU counterparts in developing improved prisoner transfer arrangements. Not that this would 
be without a political price (from a right-wing perspective). Early in the post –referendum stage of 
the Brexit process, it was foreseen that retaining any benefits from AFJS cooperation would require 
greater compliance with the acquis: a paradoxical outcome ‘with the UK having to accept more EU 
law than it currently does as an EU Member State’, including for the protection of human rights, 
‘part of which it currently is at liberty to disregard under its opt-outs’. 27  
The UK Government can do very little unilaterally. The Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill was 
announced in December 2019 in the Johnson Administration’s first Queen’s Speech. This is intended 
to extend arrest without warrant, currently permissible only in EAW cases, to any person wanted 
under an Interpol red notice from specifically designated countries. If the UK were to have no access 
an EAW equivalent after 31 December 2020, any person identified from a red notice, or, 
unrealistically if access were to be retained, on the SIS II system28 could still be arrested on behalf of 
an EU or EEA member state by designating (in secondary legislation) those countries. In practice 
such tinkering with extradition would never redress the loss of the more efficient MLR surrender 
procedure. 
 
22Similarly: the ‘coherence of Europe’s area of criminal justice’ is challenged by participation in AFJS law 
enforcement measures but not the defence rights measures that are intrinsic to AFJS judicial cooperation, 
Hustinx et al.(n 4) 11. 
23 For example, despite an initial unwillingness to engage with Data Protection doctrine, the UK positively co-
shaped the EU legal framework and regulatory practices, including personal data processing by law 
enforcement agencies, see: P. de Hert, and V. Papakonstantinou, ‘The rich UK contribution to the field of EU 
data protection: Let's not go for “third country” status after Brexit’ Computer Law & Security Review, (2017) 33 
356. A similar emphasis on the UK providing the model for EU criminal justice data processing, but caveated by 
an anticipation that the UK would need to formally prove ‘adequacy’ arrangements .. just like any other third 
country’ is made by D. Curtin, CSF - SSSUP Working Paper Series: Brexit and The EU Area Of Freedom, Security 
And Justice: Bespoke Bits and Pieces, (Centro Studi sul Federalismo: Turin, 2017) 17. 
24 S. Hufnagel, ‘Third Party’ Status in EU Policing and Security Comparing the Position of Norway with the UK 
before and after the “Brexit”’ (2016) 3 Nordisk Politiforskning 170. 
25 E.g. Justice Committee (n 15).  
26 Curtin (n 19) 6-7. 
27 V Mitsilegas, ‘European Criminal Law After Brexit’ (2017) 28 Criminal Law Forum 249–250. 
28This was a peculiar premise as SISII access was always highly unlikely, House of Lords European Union 
Committee, Brexit the proposed UK-EU security treaty (HL 2017-19 164) C. Mortera-Martinez’s evidence at 
Q26.  




An incident during the scrutiny of the Bill illustrates how the interrelationship  of human rights, 
criminal justice cooperation and Brexit could result in political misrepresentation about ’judicial 
activism’. The Bill was amended in the House of Lords to introduce an effective political safeguard 
against the designation of countries with poor human rights records.29 A minister argued (somewhat 
ironically, in view of the UK Internal Market Bill considered below) that the amendment was 
unnecessary: 
… there are countries in the world which do not respect the rule of law and a concern was 
raised that a future Government may seek to add such countries to this legislation .... even if 
the Government could get it through Parliament, the courts would throw it out.30 
The former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, intervened against the Government on this issue, possibly 
because of a reluctance to see the courts set up so carelessly or brazenly for a future judges v 
Parliament clash over human rights. 31 
The UK Government’s February 2020 negotiating mandate for the future EU-UK relationship 
acknowledged how EU-UK ‘law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’ was in 
both parties’ interests’.32 Two objectives directly relevant to this article were listed: (a) ‘fast-track 
extradition arrangements’ based on the EU (MLR facilitated) Surrender Agreement with Norway and 
Iceland33 and (b) ‘effective’ (the emphasis is on trying to negotiate ‘time limited’) processes for 
‘prisoners to be moved closer to home and be rehabilitated in the community to which they will be 
released’. This could ‘build and improve on’ the relevant CoE instrument. 34 The document was 
evasive, however, about Convention rights compliance35 and, arguably, somewhat disingenuous 
about the role of the CJEU (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in such future cooperation.36 
The document referred to ‘… a separate agreement with its own appropriate and proportionate 
governance mechanism’ and no role for the CJEU in resolving EU- UK disputes’.37  
The small print, however, tells another story. Taking as an example the most recent third-country 
agreement cited as a possible precedent in the UK document - the Swiss Prüm (a criminal justice 
data sharing system) accession instrument38 - this requires: (a) jurisprudential compliance through a 
 
29 See, HL Deb 15 June 2020, vol 803, cols 1953-1973 for discussion during the Third Reading when the 
Schedule to the Bill was amended to add sub-clauses (8) (b) (ii) and (9) to the proposed new clause 74B of the 
Extradition Act 2003. At the time of writing (excluding corrections) this amendment had been rejected by the 
House of Commons (HC Deb 8 September 2020, vol 679 cols 574 – 578), but legislative ping- pong between the 
two Houses had not ended at the time of writing this article (30 September 2020).. 
 30Ibid. col 1968. 
31 Ibid. col 1965. For a general critique of the Bill see: Justice, Extradition (Provisional Arrest) Bill House of Lords 
Second Reading Briefing  
 < https://justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/JUSTICE-Extradition-Provisional-Arrest-Bill-2020-HL-
Second-Reading-Briefing.pdf > accessed 29 September 2020. 
32 UK Government, The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK’s Approach to Negotiations (CP211, 2020), 
para 28. 
33 Ibid. para 51. 
34 Ibid. para 53. 
35 Ibid. para 31: ‘The agreement should not specify how the UK or the EU Member States should protect and 
enforce human rights and the rule of law within their own autonomous legal systems’. 
36 Ibid. para 30. 
37Ibid para 30. 
38 Decision (EU) 2019/1187 on Prüm data sharing with the Swiss Federation [2019] OJ L 187/3. 




uniform application and interpretation by the courts of the participating third country, entailing (i) 
the constant review of the development of CJEU and Swiss case law and (ii) scope for the Swiss 
Confederation to participate in the CJEU proceedings should an EU Member State seek a preliminary 
ruling relevant to the agreement;39 and (b) the concurrent transposition of future amendments of 
the EU Prüm instruments, with the Swiss Confederation given three months to decide whether to 
‘independently’ transpose any amendments to the original EU instruments into its internal legal 
order, normally within two years or the agreement would automatically lapse.40 
The omission of MLR enforcement of alternatives to custody measures from the list of UK criminal 
justice objectives was consistent with an earlier opt-out, but in penal terms runs contrary to the 
rehabilitative stance of the prisoner transfer objective. The failure to include MLR financial penalty 
enforcement is surprising. This had been judged necessary by the Cameron Administration for 
ensuring that ‘any dissuasive effects of monetary penalties are not diminished’,41 especially for 
reducing road traffic offences. Data is scarce, but it appears that surprisingly little money has been 
collected as a result of mutual enforcement.42  
The EU February 2020 negotiating mandate unambiguously sets out legal parameters for post-Brexit 
cooperation: (a) continued UK ECHR compliance conditionality,43 including the ability of individuals 
to enforce Convention rights directly in the courts 44and (b) recognition of the non-negotiable 
integrity of the EU legal order.45 The necessary application of these two parameters (with the direct 
application of the CFREU (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) in place of the 
ECHR) for third country cooperation – with or without a future EU-UK agreement - became clearer 
two months later from I.N/ Ruska Federacija.46 Having considered the significance for human rights 
protection of individual circumstances resulting from freedom of movement within the Single 
Market and the relationship of the EU legal order through a third-party MLR cooperation agreement 
with Iceland,47 the CJEU held: 
 
39 Ibid. Art. 3. For similar case law compliance conditionality in Decision 2006/697/EC on the surrender 
procedure between EU Member States and Iceland and Norway [2006] L 292/1, see Hustinx et al. (n 4) 64 and 
Davies and Arnell (n 12).  
40 Decision (EU) 2019/1187 (n 34) Art 5. 
41 European Scrutiny Committee, The UK's block opt–out of pre–Lisbon criminal law and policing measures: 
Government Response to the Committee's Twenty-first Report of Session 2013–14 (HC 2013–14  978) 38. 
42 Between June 2010 and September 2012, 393 cases were notified to England, with a total value of just over 
£90,000. There were 126 outgoing penalties between December 2010 and October 2012. The total value of 
the outgoing penalties in this period was approximately £50,000. See: European Scrutiny Committee, The UK's 
block opt–out of pre–Lisbon criminal law and policing measures (HC 2013–14 683) para 153. German data 
ismore detailed, revealing between 2010- 2018, 137 UK notifications to Germany and 700 in the other 
direction; See: C. Johnson and B. Häussermann, ‘Mutual Recognition of Financial Penalties: Practical 
Experiences with the Application of Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA in Germany’ (2019) Eurocrim 2 < 
https://eucrim.eu/media/issue/pdf/eucrim_issue_2019-02.pdf#page=41  > accessed on 11 August 2020. 
43 Council Directive, 5870/20 ADD 1 REV 3 of 25 February 2020 Annex to Council Decision authorising the 
opening of negotiations with the UK for a new partnership agreement,  para. 12. 
44 Ibid. para. 118.  
45 Ibid. para 117. 
46 Case C-897/19 PPU I.N/Ruska Federacija [2020] ECLI:EU:C 262. 
47 In short, EEA citizenship, Schengen freedom of movement/purchase of services, the Norway/Iceland MLR 
surrender agreement and the EEA Agreement as an integral part of EU law were all relevant to how extradition 
under the CoE convention would be prohibited if Article 19(2) CFREU were to be engaged. 




… in the absence of an international convention on this subject between the European 
Union and the third State concerned, … the rules on extradition fall within the competence 
of the Member States. However, as is clear from the Court’s case-law, those same Member 
States are required to exercise that competence in accordance with EU law …48   
Future Irish-UK prisoner transfers and extradition, even in the absence of an EU agreement that 
includes such a process, might well be held to fall within the ambit of this decision. Given the extra 
complexity of CTA residency and other rights stemming from the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement 
(BWA),49  the prospect of this jurisprudence affecting prisoner transfer (plus other aspects of 
extradition) is not contingent on an EU-UK treaty being in place by the end of the Article 50 process. 
It would be in the UK interest, however, to agree a treaty (even if after I January 202150 ) to attempt 
to reduce some of the legal uncertainty about how CJEU case law might affect UK criminal justice 
cooperation with Ireland and other EU member states.  
There is also a more recent political dimension to legal uncertainty about EU-UK criminal justice 
cooperation. Confidence in whether human rights will continue to be embedded in the legal systems 
of the three UK jurisdictions has been undermined by the UK Government’s behaviour during the 
2020 negotiating period. This follows long standing combination of right-wing hostility to human 
rights and policy-making deferential to penal populism.51  It is impossible for EU institutions, 
including CJEU to ignore, the admission by a UK Cabinet Minister that the Government would 
knowingly table legislation52 that, if enacted, would ‘break international law’ by not honouring 
certain UK obligations under the BWA. 53 International trust in the unquestionably autonomous UK 
legal order was bound to be damaged when UK Ministers sought powers under the UK Internal 
Markets Bill 2020 to override in secondary legislation any conflicting UK laws, including primary 
legislation, and international obligations.54 Similarly EU officials, together with lawyers and courts in 
EU in member states, will also be aware of misleading55 and error prone56  statements about the 
impact of human rights on the balance of powers within UK. This has often been coupled with 
 
48 I.N/Ruska Federacija (n 46) [48]; see also Davies and Arnell’s consideration (n 12) of Petruhhin.  
49 For the preservation of residency rights for EU and UK citizens within the area of the former EU 28 see: Title 
II, Chap 1 of The Agreement on the Withdrawal of the UK from the EU and the EAEC  (31 January 2020 OJ L 
29/7) (BWA). A more ambitious argument is that although the EU is not formally a party to the Good Friday 
Agreement (GDF), Northern Ireland could, in line with the GDF, ultimately re-join the EU as part of a united 
Ireland and ‘is therefore currently in a position not dissimilar to an applicant state who the EU has formally 
agreed to admit, but has yet to complete the formalities for doing so’ (D Phinnemore and K Hayward, UK 
Withdrawal (‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday Agreement (European Parliament, Brussels 2017) 40).  The Protocol 
on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the BWA may have established or added to the significance of the GDF within 
the EU legal order.  
50 For a similar view about a possible intermission and the significance of CJEU jurisprudence on the automatic 
priority given to member state surrender requests over third country extradition requests, see Davies and 
Arnell (n 12). 
51 For this term see: N Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 76. 
52 United Kingdom Internal Market Bill 2020 (UKIMB), as introduced into the House of Commons. The Bill was 
still subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and potential amendment at the time of writing. 
53 HC Deb 8 September 2020, vol 679, col 509. 
54 UKIMB (n 49) clause 45. 
55E. g , misrepresentation of the range of legislative options arising from  Hirst v U K (No. 2) App no. 74025/01 
(ECtHR, 30 March 2004), see: G Slapper, ‘The Ballot Box and the Jail Cell’ (2011) JCL 75 1-3. 
56 E.g., ’Moggygate’ reported by O Wright and A McSmith (n 5). 




headline seeking statements about greater punitiveness to deter terrorism and other serious 
crimes,57 even talk of retrospective changes to current sentences.58  
The Irish record is mixed: as bad as the UK in opting-out of internationally enforceable AFJS legal aid/ 
assistance commitments (see Table 2) and poor prison physical conditions (especially with ‘slopping 
out’). 59 There is, nevertheless, some cautious optimism about the prospects of policy developments 
that could reduce the overuse of imprisonment.60 Dialogue with Dublin about non-negotiable 
preconditions for criminal justice cooperation – by focusing on its political importance for protecting 
the GFA (Good Friday Agreement) and wider criminal justice/security issues within the CTA -might 
help the current or a future Conservative government to moderate its party’s populist rhetoric over 
human rights and penal policy.  
The March 2020 EU draft treaty contains much that is helpful politically. The sections relevant to 
MLR surrender and prisoner transfer in surrender cases unambiguously maintain the fundamental 
rights aspects of the acquis and autonomy of the EU legal order, but in a way that respects the UK 
Government’s post-Brexit political sensitivities. The detail of what is envisaged in the March draft 
and UK objectives is described and contextualised in Table 2 (at the end of this article). The salient 
points, however, are that the AFSJ acquis would be protected in cooperation arrangements with the 
UK jurisdictions by: 
• requiring the UK jurisdictions and, as a consequence of  this in the specific context of EU-UK  
cooperation, Ireland also, to enforce more fundamental rights than it accepted as an EU 
Member State (those relating to access to legal etc. assistance and legal aid), but only for 
those elements of the acquis offered to the UK (initially, for the purposes of this article, 
extradition and not sentenced prisoner transfer where conviction did not follow extradition); 
• providing for dispute resolution under the auspices of a council structure co-chaired by the 
EU and UK, and with access to arbitration is politically and legally neutral between the EU 
and UK; 
• reserving the determination of questions of EU law to the CJEU, but – while not allowing any 
court within the UK jurisdictions to refer questions about the interpretation of EU law to 
CJEU - giving the UK Government an unequivocal right to have appropriate proceedings 
initiated at the Luxembourg court and to be represented directly in any proceedings related 
to the treaty. 
The treaty, at least in the March draft, does not satisfy British ambitions (for example, it offers Prüm 
data sharing, but not, as foreseen for some time, SISII access rights). The lack of prisoner transfer 
beyond a right to post-conviction repatriation in extradition cases in the draft treaty could be 
explained by recognition in Brussels that (a) not all aspects of the AFSJ acquis are effectively 
 
57e.g., see: J Grierson, ‘”Justice week” slams door on progressive approach to fighting crime’ The Guardian 13 
August 2019 14. More recently the emphasis seemed to have switched to how human rights obligations might 
impede the deportation of asylum seekers. See: O Bowcott, No 10 plans to “opt out” of human rights laws to 
speed up deportations’, The Guardian 14 September 6. 
58 J Grierson, Does Prison Work? Longer terms “may simply delay attacks or fuel radicalisation’ The Guardian 4 
February 2020 6. 
59 C. Hamilton (n 9) 205 - 229.  
60 M. Rogan and M. Reilly, ‘Overusing the Criminal Justice System: the Case of Ireland’ in P.H.van Kempen and 
M Jendly (eds.), Overuse in the Criminal Justice system (Intersentia, Cambridge 2019) 391-415. 




functional or (b) there would be  limits to what could be resolved in a possibly eleven month 
negotiating period. Hence, the importance of the proposed permanent, transparent and accountable 
structure offered in the draft treaty to extend and develop the operational scope of future EU-UK 
relationship though inter-jurisdictional (mainly but not exclusively EU and UK government and 
Parliament, there is also scope for civil society participation) policy development.  
This proposed institutional structure for treaty review and amendment would be essential for 
criminal justice cooperation. Initial and additional arrangements, such as prisoner transfer, need to 
remain consistent with interlinked but frequently evolving EU and UK criminal justice measures. The 
alternative to intermittent, but regular and structured post-Brexit readjustment that the treaty’s 
organisational structure offers, is the multiple reoccurrence of something like the thirteen year saga 
to bring into operation the 2006 Norway and Iceland MLR Surrender Agreement,61 and after that the 
separate but ad hoc and very one-sided adjustment processes required under that instrument.  
Prisoner transfer between Ireland and the UK jurisdictions in context 
In the absence on 1 January 2021 of new EU-UK criminal justice cooperation arrangements, the 
default position in Ireland would be to implement the extradition provisions of the Withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom from the European Union (Consequential Provisions) Act 2019 to ensure that 
the extradition of an Irish citizen ‘62 to another CTA jurisdiction would be lawful. This would be 
conditional on reciprocity (i.e. UK assurances that it intends to continue to extradite its citizens to 
Ireland post-Brexit), 63 but without any internationally enforceable conditionality over legal aid 
obligations, repatriation options and Convention/Charter rights after conviction. The omissions 
could result in successful legal challenges in Ireland or before the CJEU. Other causes of delays or 
absolute impediments might be encountered such as the absolute priority for an EAW issued for the 
surrender of the same person which could create impunity where the UK jurisdiction offence is 
much more serious. 64 This would be significant politically if the Article 50 negotiations end badly, or 
the outcome otherwise threatens Northern Ireland’s fragile peace. 
Because of the Irish delay in transposing the EU prison transfer instrument, all CTA transfers at 
present must rely on Irish legislation implementing a CoE convention (hereafter PTC).65 This, like 
extradition facilitated by the Act of 2019, is unsatisfactory from a human rights perspective and may, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, be contrary to Art 47 CFREU because of a similar 
absence of statutory human rights safeguards (including legal aid/ assistance, see: Table 2) intrinsic 
to the transfer process.  The PTC clearly falls well short of what is needed to facilitate the UK 
Government’s ambitions for ‘time limited’ prisoner repatriation, but are there other grounds for its 
dissatisfaction with this measure? A comparison with the AFJS instrument is helpful when 
considering this question.   
 
61 Marked by the Notice concerning the entry into force of the Surrender Agreement between the European 
Union, Iceland and Norway [2019] L 230/1. 
62 Otherwise prohibited under the Extradition Act 1965, s.14. 
63 The Act of 2019, s. 93. 
64 See Davies and Arnell (n 12). It is not unreasonable to foresee less serious charges from elsewhere in the EU 
rendering extradition impossible to the UK for the gravest of crimes (including terrorist actions). 
65 The Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 1983, European Treaty Series - No. 112, Strasbourg, 
21.III.1983 (hereafter PTC), implemented under the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act 1995 (as amended).   




 Under the Convention, subject to physical or mental capacity and excluding where deportation has 
been ordered, repatriation is consensual.66 Also, if the sentence is ‘by its nature or duration 
incompatible with the law of the administering State, or its law so requires’ the term may be altered 
judicially in the executing state to correspond to its own custodial tariffs.67 (The exemption from 
consent in deportation cases is of limited effect within the CTA. Under English law Irish nationals 
with established residency68 and, in most circumstances, EU citizens with similar (after 31 December 
2020 BWA ‘preserved’) residency rights in the UK69 cannot be deported, other than in exceptional 
circumstances. Deportation also requires cooperation by the destination state.) 
The AFJS instrument differs materially from the Convention in several respects beyond being 
designed to facilitate quicker and often non-consensual transfers,70 with (a) residency as well as 
nationality determining  permissible transfer destinations,71 (b) greater restrictions on the scope to 
impede transfer,72 including  a simpler approach to double criminality,73 and (c) a more restricted 
approach to altering the custodial term: changes are (i) restricted to terms that in the executing 
state exceed the maximum penalty there and (ii) may not be reduced to less than the maximum 
penalty in that state for similar offences;74and (iii) the two states may, on a case-by-case basis, 
negotiate how to adapt the custodial term provided this does not result in a more severe penalty.75 
The executing state has sole discretion about how to determine all the measures relating to serving 
the sentence, including the grounds for early or conditional release,76 but in doing so may take 
account of the national law of the issuing state.77  
PTC transfers into Ireland have been modest and in 2018 ceased (at least temporarily) altogether. 
The introduction of this process met a pent-up demand for transfers within the CTA (93% of 
requested transfers into Ireland and 89% of outward applications). 78 An average of 19 prisoners 
returned to Ireland each year between 1997 and 2014, with, on 4 December 2018, 27 prisoners 
seeking repatriation (19 from UK prisons).79 These arrangements stalled when a series of judgments, 
in the words of a former Minister for Justice and Equality ‘raised a number of complex issues about 
the legislation and its administration, indicating that legislative change is required’.80  
 
66 Ibid. Arts. 3 (1) (d) and Art 7 ( the removal of the consent requirement when the sentence includes 
deportation was effected under The Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced 
Persons European Treaty Series - No. 167, Strasbourg, 18.XII.1997 Art 3). 
67 Ibid. Art. 10-11. 
68 Immigration Act 1971 s 7. 
69 Bouchereau [1978] QB 732; Kraus 4 Cr App R (S) 113; and Nazari [1980] 1 WLR 1366.  
70 Prisoner Transfer (Table 2) Art. 6.(2)-(4). 
71 Ibid. Art. 4. 
72 Ibid. Art. 9. 
73 Ibid. Art. 7. 
74 Ibid. Art. 8. 
75 Ibid. Art. 10 
76 Ibid. Art. 17 (1). 
77 Ibid. Art. 7( 4). 
78 1995 and 1996 data cited in CAJ, ICPO, NAPO and NIACRO, A Review of the Operation of the 1997 Transfer of 
Prisoners Act (The Committee on the Administration of Justice, Belfast 1997) 5. 
79 C. Gallagher, New laws needed to allow Irish prisoners abroad return home, Irish Times, 8 May 2018 
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-laws-needed-to-allow-irish-prisoners-abroad-return-
home-1.3486942 >accessed on 6 July 2020 and Dáil debates, written answers, 4 December 2018 (250). 
80 Ibid. 




The first of these judgments81 established that automatic release in England at the 50% point, with 
the balance of the sentence to be served on licence, could not be approximately replicated in 
Ireland.82 In O'Farrell & Ors83 a majority of the Supreme Court found that the prisoner transfer 
process to Ireland was ‘fundamentally defective’84. At least ten UK prisoners transferred to Ireland to 
serve lengthy sentences, including for plotting a bombing campaign (the ‘Slovak three’ arrested after 
a MI5 arms sting in Slovakia85) and drug smuggling had to be released. 86 A third case established two 
other bars to transfer: (a) the now abolished English sentence of indefinite imprisonment for public 
protection is, except for some overlap with the public protection element of life sentences, unknown 
in Irish law and (b), the incompatibility of the prospective transferee’s guilt denial with the 
rehabilitative/resettlement objectives of transfer.  A systemic problem with the legislation noted in 
the third judgment was that the Minister’s consent to the proposed transfer is required before it can 
be definitively determined what the custodial period in Ireland would be.87  
These difficulties are not all necessarily Irish in origin, but the political background to the 
transposition of the PTC was certainly a contributory factor. It was noted in the O'Farrell & ors 
judgment how this had facilitated transfers to Ireland before all the potential legal problems issues 
had been resolved.88 The problems considered in that case could ‘only be understood in its historical 
context’ in which the original legislation had been hastily revised in a way that provided a high level 
of political control over alterations to the custodial term. This had happened when the repatriation 
of prisoners held in the United Kingdom for terrorist offences [had become] an ‘emotive issue’ 
(emphases from the text of the judgment):89 
[Amending legislation] was introduced in some haste, as paving the way in negotiations 
leading to the Good Friday Multi-Party Agreement in 1998. … [The original legislation] 
provided that, where a sentence was adapted, it should, as far as was practicable, 
correspond to the nature of the sentence imposed by the sentencing state, and should not, 
in any event, be: ‘(a) aggravated by its legal nature or duration, or (b) exceed the maximum 
penalty prescribed by the law of the [Irish] State for a similar offence.”… . 
 [The amended legislation provided that … the High Court might adapt the legal nature, and 
the duration of the sentence; and that in considering a sentence, a court might adapt either 
 
81In Ireland the earliest automatic release date normally occurs at the 75% and then without the conditionality 
of a licence, Sweeney v. Governor of Loughlan House Open Centre & Ors [2014] IESC 42.  
82 For release on licence in Ireland: see, M. Rogan and M. Reilly (n 57) 411. 
83 O'Farrell & ors -v- The Governor of Portlaoise Prison [2016] IESC [37]. 
84 Ibid. [86] 
85 T. Parker, Avoiding the Terrorist Trap: Why Respect for Human Rights is the Key to Defeating Terrorism 
(World Scientific Europe, London 2019) 552-553.  
86 C. O’Doherty, ‘Inmates moved from UK freed by loophole’, Irish Examiner, May 04, 2015 
<https://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/inmates-moved-from-uk-freed-by-loophole-328564.html > accessed 
on 13 July 2020. 
87 M.McK v The Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IEHC 208. 
88 ‘ … enforcement in the prisoner’s home country gained priority over more theoretical considerations. (See 
Epp ‘The European Convention’, in International Criminal Law, Bassiouni 2nd Ed Transnational Publication, 
New York, p563, et seq.)’ O'Farrell & ors (n 83) [20]. 
89 O'Farrell & ors (n 82) [20]. Prisoner release and to lesser extent repatriation have had a major significance 
for peace and reconciliation in Irish history, particularly in the period before the GFA referendum, see: K 
McEvoy, ‘Prisoners, the Agreement, and the Political Character of the Northern Ireland Conflict’ (1998) 
22Fordham International Law Journal  1539-1576. 




or both, but only on application of the Minister. … any application to adapt legal nature or 
duration could only be made by the Minister, and no one else. The process of adaptation 
was, in a sense, to be ‘ring fenced’ for this purpose. 90 
The amendments - reflecting the political sensitivities about prison transfer between Ireland and the 
four UK jurisdictions in the period leading up to the negotiation and acceptance of the GFA - ensured 
political control over the initiation of adaptation. The process of adaptation itself was left 
ambiguous, for example, by allowing the warrants to be varied in certain circumstances, but it was 
unclear if this extended to allowing sentences to be varied. Presumably the intergovernmental 
machinery created under the GDF did not extend to or proved ineffective for anticipating and 
resolving the problems exposed by O'Farrell & or. 
Even less hastily developed cooperation arrangements may prove to be sub-optimal. Research 
undertaken by Marguery and his colleagues focused on MLR transfers (both sentenced prisoner 
transfer and extradition) resulted in his comment that ‘mutual trust can have a disruptive effect on 
the retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation functions of punishment’.91  It is clear from ECtHR case 
law (see the final section), however, that some the systemic problems identified by their research 
into the operation of the AFSJ acquis apply equally to the PTC and the CoE extradition convention.  
This research identified concerns, such as, repatriation for budgetary rather than rehabilitative 
objectives;92 insufficient protection in the transfer instrument for the principle of speciality;93 and 
whether a prisoner’s interests can be adequately protected without ensuring legal assistance by a 
lawyer or oversight by a judge with sufficient specialist knowledge.94 These conclusions were derived 
from empirical research undertaken in a representative cross-section of five EU member states with 
significant legal and socio-economic differences.95 Some of the problems reported by Marguery and 
his colleagues had also been identified in research published seven years earlier by Vermeulen et 
al.96 This highlighted risks arising from significant socio-economic disparities that might directly 
impact on justice, including access to effective advice for the suspect/accused person or prisoner to 
legal advice in the issuing and executing state, and highly material differences in prison conditions.  
These research findings should not have surprised Commission officials. Three of the major prisoner 
transfer risks were anticipated in the 2011 EC Green Paper on MLR facilitated cooperation: (a) poor 
prison conditions (possibly not meeting the minimum standards of the CoE Prison Rules in some 
countries; (b) inadequate information for all the parties when transfer is being initiated; and (c) 
budget driven decisions (e.g. transfers initiated to reduce overcrowding). It acknowledged also that 
different early release or remission arrangements could result in the period of incarceration being 
materially extended following repatriation.97Also of direct relevance to the UK seeking to continue to 
 
90 O'Farrell & ors (n 83) [46-47]. 
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93 Ibid. 
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cherry pick MLR surrender and a new form of prisoner transfer, but not alternative to custody 
measures, and Ireland’s record of infringement proceedings in respect of the latter instrument (see 
Table 2), it posed a question about the integrity of the AFJS acquis: 
The Framework Decision applies the principle of mutual recognition to many of these 
alternatives to custody and measures facilitating early release. Its correct application would 
imply that probation measures and alternatives to imprisonment would be available in all 
legal systems across the Union. These measures may then have to be promoted at Union 
level for a proper and efficient application of the rules by Member States. 98 
Inter-jurisdictional cooperation that deliberately or through lack of commitment excludes 
alternatives to custody lacks penological (and fiscal) coherence.  
How courts approach prisoner conditions and prisoner treatment litigation 
The massive backlog of applications before the ECtHR and non-executed judgements before the CoE 
Council of Ministers makes any assessment of Strasbourg jurisprudence on prisons 
conditions/prisoner treatment highly provisional. 99 Anagnostou and Skleparis have provided an 
invaluable survey of ECtHR prison judgments and their impact on prison conditions and prisoner 
treatment, but this comes with caveats about comprehensiveness and methodology.100  
In this and the next section the analysis will move frequently between ECtHR and CJEU case law 
because of their strong interrelationship or interdependency in the human rights law relevant to this 
article. This was not always (quite reasonably) thought to be likely:  
 ‘We should not expect the CJEU to become a fully-fledged fundamental rights court. A 
temptation to do so would provoke strong reactions in some states and their national 
courts’101  
In Aranyosi and Căldăraru,102 however, the CJEU took a decisive Strasbourg turn shortly after the 
Lisbon Treaty had come fully into effect. The prospect that prison conditions after MLR surrender 
might result in ‘a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of ’CFREU Art. 4 
initiated a series of judgments. Theses have set out limits to the automaticity mandated generally in 
MLR cooperation instruments. Preliminary references before Brexit from the Irish courts in 
O’Connor103 and R O104 relating to surrender requests from, respectively, England and Northern 
Ireland suggest that criminal justice cooperation within the CTA but across the EU border will further 
consolidate this jurisprudence in response to whatever twists and turns post-Brexit readjustment 
takes.  For Ireland, as an EU member its ability to cooperate with the UK will be influenced by how all 
 
98 Ibid. 7. 
99 see: A Donald and P Leach, ‘The Role of Parliaments Following Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ in M Hunt, HJ Hooper and P Yowell, Parliaments and Human Rights (Hart, Oxford 2017) 59-60. 
100 D Anagnostou and D. Skleparis, ‘Human Rights In European Prisons: Can the Implementation of Strasbourg 
Court Judgments Influence Penitentiary Reform Domestically?’ in T Dams and L Robert (ed.) Europe in Prisons 
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101 S Douglas-Scott, ‘The relationship between the EU and The ECHR five years on from the Treaty of 
Lisbon’ (2015) Oxford University Legal Research Paper XX/2015 20. 
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103 Minister for Justice v O’Connor [2018] IESC 19. 
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inter-jurisdictional cooperation ‘rests on a bundle of rights and obligations from which it is not easy 
or in some cases possible to extricate certain instruments, especially from the outside,’105 with the 
scope for scrutiny (as restated in I.N/Ruska Federacija) including, where relevant, the operation of 
CoE conventions and EU-third country instruments outside the AFSJ acquis.106 
There are three circumstances where the CJEU might directly become involved in the scrutiny of 
criminal justice cooperation within the CTA that results in the transfer of prisoners across the EU 
border: (a) over the legality of any EU act concerning EU/Member State cooperation with the UK; (b) 
at the request of an Irish court on the compatibility with EU law of any agreement on which 
extradition or repatriation is sought and (c), irrespective of whether an EU-UK  agreement is in force, 
an Irish court submit a preliminary question to the CJEU.107 Otherwise the Irish courts will still be 
required to scrutinise extradition/MLR surrender and prisoner transfer within a margin of discretion’ 
allowed to them under EU law when dealing with challenges to transfer or extradition based on 
human rights and/or other aspects of EU law. 
This approach is influenced by ECtHR jurisprudence, but cannot offer the same flexibility to national 
courts and legislatures as the ‘large margin of appreciation’ allowed to Convention states.108 That 
doctrine has been criticised – most notably in a famous dissenting opinion in an ECtHR judgment - 
for an implied relativism about universal values: 
… where human rights are concerned, there is no room for a margin of appreciation which 
would enable the States to decide what is acceptable and what is not.109 
Even that opinion concedes, however, that a margin of appreciation is entirely appropriate for some 
legal decisions, for example and of direct relevance to this article, when a criminal court determines 
a sentence ‘within the range of penalties laid down by the legislature - according to its assessment of 
the seriousness of the case’.110  The margin of appreciation is best understood, however, for its 
consistency with ECHR plurality. Convention obligations are ‘part and parcel of each national legal 
order rather than an external framework’ and ECtHR ‘judgments do not have a traditionally 
understood direct top down effect … It is the Member States who are entrusted with the protection 
of the values laid down by the Convention, not (primarily) the Court on its own.’111  
In a markedly different legal order, with the emphasis on the primacy and direct effect in EU 
member states, the Luxembourg court’s margin of discretion will operate differently. For example, 
there is no freedom to discriminate between member state nationals and non-national residents 
‘who have demonstrated a certain degree of integration in the society of that Member State’. 112 It is 
for the local court (echoing Aranyosi and Căldăraru and anticipating I.N/Ruska Federacij,), however, 
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to assess extradition (and presumably transfer) cases in the light of ‘the objective factors 
characterising the situation of the requested person’.113  
ECtHR has developed extensive case law about how national courts should assess whether 
Convention rights have been breached, or can be anticipated, in respect of poor prison conditions 
and treatment. Firstly, Soering114 and Chahal 115 established the absolute nature of such protection, 
with no room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for extradition or expulsion. 
Though the threshold for what is eventually determined to be prohibited may still be relative to the 
circumstances of the case or the subjective characteristics of the applicant.116 Secondly, engagement 
can occur with the anticipation of an infringement of Article 3 occurring. It does not need to await an 
actual infringement.  From Soering onwards extradition and transfer could be challenged on the 
basis of the ‘suffering risked’. 117 Thirdly, Cahal drew attention to the need for confidence that the 
domestic legal order offered the means to enforce Convention rights in the destination state.118 In 
principle EU law also holds that the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading conditions is 
absolute,119 but goes further than Strasbourg jurisprudence on the means to secure and protect this 
right,120 with Article 47 CFREU requiring that legal aid/ assistance should be available for that 
purpose.  
The Luxembourg court has offered guidance on how the objectivity envisaged in the text of the EAW 
instrument121 can be established. This is to be found initially in Aranyosi and Căldăraru in 2016, but 
was subsequently reiterated in I.N/Ruska Federacija: 
The competent authority of the requested Member State, such as the referring court, must 
rely, for the purposes of that verification, on information that is objective, reliable, specific 
and properly updated. That information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of 
international courts, such as judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, judgments 
of courts of the requesting third State, and also decisions, reports and other documents 
produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations …  122 
In I.N/Ruska Federacija there was ‘a particularly substantial piece of evidence’123to be taken into 
account for the purposes of the verification, the grant of asylum ‘based precisely on the criminal 
proceedings’ in the extradition request. 124 As will be seen in the next section establishing objectivity 
is rarely so straight forward. 
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Both courts make it clear that applicants face a very high bar. This was stated in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence as a ‘serious and irreparable’ risk that Article 3 rights would not be safeguarded.125 
CJEU likewise has emphasised mutual trust in fundamental rights compliance126 and the need to 
prevent impunity from criminal responsibility when domestic courts assess challenges to MLR 
surrender or, as in I.N/Ruska Federacija, extradition.127  
This high bar has been expressed in English national case law, notably (for extradition/ MLR 
surrender) in Celinski128 and HH:129  
• There is a very high presumption on ‘ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured’, 
but the weight to be attached to it in the particular case varies according to the nature and 
seriousness of the crime or crimes involved.130 
• Decisions are highly case specific, and precedents are proportionately relevant to the extent 
that the instant case fits the specific context of the reported case.131  
• A balancing test is to be applied, particularly where there is interference with the 
Convention right to family life, but with considerable deference to the judgement of the 
adjudicatory tribunal in the executing state about the impact of any sentence.132 
Irish case law is broadly similar to English jurisprudence in the reliance on ECtHR on balancing the 
prevention of impunity with the protection of non-derogable article 3 rights, and specifically 
acknowledged in Damache and Celmer a common approach with a distinction between Article  3, 
which pivots on a ‘real risk’ of violation, and other Convention rights (including ‘fair trial’), where the 
test is the higher bar of ‘flagrant’ violation.133 The point is also made in Celmer that this distinction 
applies also to violation of Irish constitutional rights litigation.134 
This reference to the Irish Constitution requires a caveat to the case analysis in the next section. The 
Irish European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 ‘drew heavily on the text of the UK Human 
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Rights Act 1998’, 135  but ‘the interpretive obligation is more qualified…’ 136 and constitutional issues 
have to be determined by the courts prior to ECHR compatibility issues.137 Possibly Irish law is more 
unpredictable, at least that was how it appeared in 2006138  and Irish legislators and policy makers 
will have learned to take this in their stride. 139 This may not be readily appreciated by London policy 
makers and their legal advisers who, in the past and contrary to their normal politic-legal stance 
against external pressure for legal harmonisation, have attempted to press for specific approaches, 
especially on extradition, to be adopted in Irish law.140 This adds to the argument, even for 
cooperation restricted to the CTA, for (a) utilising expert deliberations to optimise the policy analysis 
underpinning new prisoner transfer measures and (b) permanent intuitional arrangements to 
anticipate, manage or mitigate potential problems (including ensuring effective interoperability with 
parallel cooperation instruments)should  sentenced prisoner transfers recommence within the CTA.  
Prison conditions and prisoner treatment: human rights issues as grounds for legal challenges or 
matters for policy development when devising new prisoner transfer arrangements? 
The high bar in international and national jurisprudence to impeding extradition or transfer, and the 
significance of the margin of appreciation/discretion considered in the previous section illustrate 
how the courts exercise considerable self-restraint over intervention in criminal justice cooperation.  
This section turns to an examination of the case law to identify for specific prison conditions and 
prisoner treatment issues:  (a) to nature of the bar to judicial intervention in those circumstances 
and (b) how limitations in the potential scope for judicial intervention should be a spur for policy 
development.  
It is clear from the parameters to the 2020 EU-UK negotiations and the legal analysis in the previous 
section that progress on a new transfer arrangement is unlikely unless ECHR compliance together 
with access to including legal aid/ assistance for enforcing Convention rights in UK courts is 
sufficiently guaranteed by London. Such a political failure would equally threaten PTC and 
extradition cooperation from 1 January 2021. Also UK compliance would resolve one of the 
problems identified by Marguery and his colleagues. Though ideally, as indicated by their research, 
assistance should be provided by penal specialists rather than more generalist criminal lawyers. 
What remains is categorised as five grounds for legal challenges relating to prison conditions and 
prisoner treatment that are potentially relevant to international custodial transfer between CTA 
jurisdictions: (a) physical conditions/overcrowding; (b) prison regime failures (e.g. health care 
failures and exposure to violence); (c) sentence equivalence; (d) rehabilitation/resettlement issues; 
and (e) non-custodial alternative disposals and discriminatory incarceration. There is obviously a 
degree of artificiality and overlap in this structure. 
 
135 D. Griffin and I. O’Donnell ‘The Life Sentence and Parole’ (2012) Brit. J. Criminol. 52, 622. 
136 Ibid,. citing ECHR Act 2003, s. 2. 
137 Ibid., citing Carmody v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] 1 IR 635; see also: C. Hamilton 
(n 9) 222. 
138 ‘… the country was convulsed by a Supreme Court decision [C.C. v Ireland & ors [2006] IESC 33] which found 
the law on statutory rape between and adult and a minor to be unconstitutional.’ D. Griffin, ‘Looking back at 
the CC case’, The Irish Times 25 April 2014 < https://www.irishtimes.com/sponsored/ombudsman-for-
children/looking-back-at-the-cc-case-1.1765178 > accessed on 31 August 2020.  
139 For political, official and reactions and wider legal repercussions to this judgment and its context see: R. 
Mac Cormaic, The Supreme Court (Penguin, Dublin 2016). 
140 Ibid 224-229. 





Physical conditions/overcrowding cases – though with probably only a small number arising from 
challenges to extradition or transfer - give rise to the greatest number of adverse ECtHR findings in 
prison related litigation.141 This is also the prison litigation category with the lowest rate of execution 
and closure in the CoE Council of Ministers.142  
Superficially within the CTA, English prisons, as far as can be ascertained from available data (Table 1 
below), appear to be most likely to give rise to judicial intervention to block inter-jurisdictional 
transfers. The risk of judicial intervention is probably low for CTA prison authorities. The offending 
and non-compliant states are mainly Eastern and Central European.143 The Strasbourg court, as 
noted below, is very much aware of the high cost of prison building and modernisation projects. 
Even systemic and chronic dysfunctionality in Italian prisons, including the lack of hot water over 
lengthy periods and inadequate lighting and ventilation, was not held by ECtHR to amount, per se, to 
inhuman and degrading treatment. 144 
The majority ECtHR judgment in Muršić 145 sought to avoid an over-formulaic approach, based on the 
square metres of living space allocated to each prisoner, in prison conditions cases, but settled on 
less than 3 sq m in a multi-occupied space to establish a rebuttable presumption (with reference to 
out-of-cell movement and activities etc.) that Convention Art 3 had been breached.  It is difficult to 
move beyond measurable standards to judgements about the physical custodial environment in 
terms of whether ‘facilities, movement, interaction and behavioural change are evidently … 
conducive to rehabilitation and, ultimately, reintegration into society’.146  This is an area where any 
new prisoner transfer arrangements would probably have to rely on case law on minimum 
measurable standards, but the operation of any new arrangements should include the provision of 
independent, comparative and specific information about both standards compliance and general 
physical conditions at the proposed destination. This should be funded and commissioned as an 
element of an entitlement to legal assistance, and should also be considered by the decision makers 
in both jurisdictions.  
Table 1 Custodial Overcrowding in the CTA147 





Northern Ireland 1,803 79.9% 
 
141 Anagnostou and Skleparis (n 100) 53 (Table 1). 
142 Ibid.61-62 (Table 4). 
143 Anagnostou and Skleparis (n 100) 53 (Table 1). 
144 Torreggiani (n 125). See also: F. Favuzza, ‘Torreggiani and Prison Overcrowding in Italy’ (2017) HRLR 17 153–
173. 
145Muršić v Croatia App no. 7334/13 (ECtHR 20 October 2016) 122-141; see also: Greer (n 116) et al. 144.  
146 Y Jewkes (quoting I Spens) in ‘Prison Contraction in an Age of Expansion: Size Matters, but does ‘New’ equal 
‘Better’ in Prison Design? (Perrie Lectures 2013) (2014) Prison Service Journal 211 36. 
147 Source: World Prison brief (Institute for Crime and Justice Policy Research). 
<https://www.prisonstudies.org/map/europe> accessed 1 June 2020. 















Prison regime failures (e.g. health care, including infectious diseases) and violence  
The extent and range of dissenting opinions in Muršić, illustrates not only the problems of settling 
rebuttable standards, but also the limitations of  physical space measurement compared with a 
more holistic assessment of the risks posed by overcrowding for a prison regime: 
Overcrowding undermines every aspect of what the public should expect from its prisons. It 
creates unsafe institutions lacking in basic decency, but also failing to provide a framework 
for the rehabilitative work which could reduce crime in the future. 148 
This comment by the chief executive of a penal reform NGO is consistent with a 2004 judgment in a 
CTA jurisdiction that referred to ‘the "triple vices" of overcrowding, slopping out and impoverished 
regime’ that  ‘cannot be viewed in isolation, since each one has an impact on, and is affected by, the 
others.’149  
Such holistic assessment of prison conditions/prisoner treatment has resulted in a significant 
number of adverse findings against wealthier Western European countries, particularly France and 
to a lesser extent Belgium, Italy and the UK.150 These cases are also notable for a higher closure rate 
than physical conditions infringements. The bar, however, remains high. In English law, in medical 
cases for example, it is unnecessary for there to be equal quality of medical care between the UK 
and the requesting state. ‘The test is whether the difference in treatment would mean that 
extradition would be oppressive.’151 Rising violence, deaths in custody and estimated high drug 
dependency in English prisons are major causes of concern and objectively verifiable from the 
available statistics and inspection reports,152 but do not appear to have resulted in judicial 
intervention either domestically or internationally. 
 
148 P Dawson, foreword to M. Halliday, Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile, Winter 2019 (Prison Reform Trust: 
London, 2019) 4. 
149 Napier v Scottish Ministers [2004] SLT 555, this judgement acknowledges the significance of evidence by 
witnesses described as ‘experienced students and examiners of prison conditions’, and on an ‘impressive body 
of consistent, informed opinion’ [51-61]. 
150 Anagnostou and Skleparis (n 100) 53 (Table1). The sub-categories are: pre-trial detention, health related 
issues (resulting in the largest number of cases after physical conditions); inhumane treatment (e.g. solitary 
confinement and degrading treatment); special regimes and violence, ill-treatment and suicide. 
151 Versluis v Public Prosecutor’s Office, Zwolle-Lelystad, [2019] EWHC 764 (Admin) [79] and [65]. 
152 ‘Prisoners and staff, are less safe than they have been at any other point since records began, with more 
self-harm and assaults than ever before. The number of self-inflicted deaths has also risen once again.’ 
Halliday (n 148) 12. Also at 42, ‘One in 10 random mandatory drug tests (MDT) in prison in 2019 were 




There is very little data in the public domain at the time of writing153 about COVID-19 in EU, EEA and 
UK prisons. The best available figures, however, indicate that English prisons had experienced the 
highest number of infections. 154 ECtHR jurisprudence already addresses a failure to protect an 
inmate against infectious disease.155 Global experience and the emergence of penal good practice 
for protecting prison staff and inmates against Covid-19 could result in anticipative jurisprudence 
based on emerging internationally standardised good practice, covering the assessment of 
preventive/protective measures (e.g. measures to reduce general overcrowding within institutions, 
clustering reduction at points of access to centralised services, including food distribution, health 
care and legal assistance) and the ‘cocooning’ of higher risk individuals.156  
The rapid spread of infectious diseases such as COVID-19 suggests that transfer should be prohibited 
if conditions in the destination jurisdiction become comparatively unsafe because of infectious 
diseases either at the destination or during transit. Violence and addiction risks should also be 
grounds for preventing or delaying transfer. Independent, comparative and location specific 
information about such risks together with in-custody rehabilitation programmes and post-custody 
resettlement support should be provided to the potential transferee and decision makers in both 
jurisdictions.  
Sentence equivalence 
The three Irish equivalence cases, Sweeney, O'Farrell & Ors and M.McK, illustrate the sometimes 
seemingly irresolvable problems that arise because of differences in national penal laws and 
sentencing practice. The second case also underlines the potentially high political significance for 
counter-terrorism and serious crime cooperation between Ireland and the UK when prisoner 
transfer arrangements fail.  
The bar to judicial intervention is high. The ECtHR has taken the view that ‘a flagrantly longer de 
facto term of imprisonment’ in the executing state ‘could entail a breach of Article 5, but did not 
consider a 20% extension of the custodial period sufficiently disproportionate to qualify.157 In more 
recent years, it has been stated that a strict requirement that the period of detention should not be 
greater than that anticipated in the sentencing country would ‘thwart the current trend towards 
strengthening international cooperation in the administration of justice’.158  
Differences in parole or licence regimes appear to bear particularly hard on transferred prisoners 
and are likely to undermine resettlement or reintegration prospects. In Szabó (compulsory transfer 
 
positive—the second highest level on record. This increases to 17% when psychoactive substances are 
included.’ 
153 30 September 2020. 
154 At 31 May 2020, 466 inmates and 949 staff members, compared with early April data for Italy (131 staff and 
21inmates), Spain (69 staff and 6 inmates) and France (114 staff and 48 inmates), ECDC Technical Report: 
Infection prevention and control and surveillance for coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in prisons in EU/EEA 
countries and the UK – July 2020 9 (ECDC, Stockholm 2020) 3. Later ECDC reports have not been sufficiently 
specific to update this information and none of this information is expressed proportionately to the size of 
national prison populations . 
155 Dobri v. Romania App no 25153/04 (ECtHR, 14 December2010). 
156 ECDC (n 153) 7-8. 
157 Szabó v Sweden, App no 28578/03 27 (ECtHR, June 2006) [9-10]. 
158 Veermäe v Sweden App no 38704/03 (ECtHR 15/03/2005).   




under the CoE additional protocol) a ‘reasonable expectation of being released in Sweden after 
having served two-thirds of a ten-year prison sentence (after six years and eight months), on 
transfer to Hungary resulted in parole eligibility at four-fifths of the sentence (after eight years),  one 
year and four months longer.159 The Strasbourg court’s reluctance to intervene in such cases has 
been explained by a view that such differences in parole eligibility are not equivalent to a sentence 
being increased as a matter of law.160   
It is also relevant to note the ECtHR ruling in favour of the UK - a case where the Swiss authorities 
had held a contrary view - in Woolley v UK. The Court held that an additional custodial period (for 
confiscation order default) imposed as an element of an earlier sentence being served when the 
applicant absconded from prison and fled abroad did not breach the speciality rule.161 The UK rather 
than Swiss reasoning was understandably more persuasive in that instance. 
These risks would need to be given priority in any inter-jurisdictional/governmental deliberations 
about the proposed new transfer measure.162 Participation by experts from Northern Ireland and 
Scotland with their Irish and English colleagues would be essential because of legal and other 
differences that would need to be identified to achieve robust conclusions for all four CTA 
jurisdictions. Academic and penal NGO research in parallel to inter-governmental work would 
provide broader penological and legal insights. The aim should be to improve the quality information 
made available to the proposed transferee, his/her legal advisers and the decision makers in both 
jurisdictions as much as improved risk management.163 
Rehabilitation and resettlement 
The PTC does not offer sentenced prisoners a right to inter-jurisdictional transfer under Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, 164 instead that is subject solely to the agreement of the states concerned.165 
Remoteness from a prisoner’s family is no longer held - as in Hacisuleymanoglou - to be an 
‘inevitable consequence of detention’. Physical distance from home/family ties and rehabilitation 
engage Article 8 ‘if the effect on the applicant’s private and family life goes beyond the “normal” 
hardships and restrictions inherent to the very concept of imprisonment’ 166 The finding against 
Russia in Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev , however, is the response to flagrant and well documented 
administrative persecution after conviction and sentence. The outcome of that case was consistent 
with doctrine developed in two much earlier (and unsuccessful) English applications: Article 8 
 
159 Szabó v Sweden (n 157). 
160 Veermäe v Sweden (n 158). 
161Woolley v UK, App no 28019/10 (ECtHR, 10 April 2012). 
162 The problems could be identified and understood by research based on the analysis of warrants/custodial 
records (including police detention and judicially authorised pre-trial custody) in actual cases and parole (or 
equivalent) record analysis. This is clearly likely to be a much more feasible for the four CTA jurisdictions than 
the EU 27 plus the UK jurisdictions. This view reflects insight gained by the author when for four years his 
responsibilities including a national dealing with sentence complaints/litigation and the provision of guidance 
in the English penal administration. 
163 There may also be internal benefits from exposing sentence calculation within penal administrations to 
wider scrutiny. A Barnett, ‘Blunders lead to violent prisoners being wrongly released’, The Independent 28 
December 2015 18, reported 48 releases in error in 2014-15. 
164 Hacisuleymanoglou v. Italy App no. 23241/94 (ECtHR 20 October 1994). 
165 Savas c. Italie App no. 25632/94 (26 février 1997). 
166 Khodorkovskiy v Lebedev v. Russia App nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05 (ECtHR 25 July 2013) [837-838]. 




creates a positive obligation (a) to assist prisoners as far as possible to create and sustain ties with 
people outside prison in order to promote social rehabilitation (Wakefield) 167 and (b) to assist 
prisoners in maintaining effective contact with their close family members (X v the UK)168 However, 
these three cases were not concerned with inter-state transfer and the bar to a similar outcome to 
Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev is high for any PTC application (e.g. with the court looking for evidence 
of seeking alternatives such as cross-border visits or transfer within the country of detention to a 
more accessible location).169 
The case law summarised and culminating in I.N/Ruska Federacija 170is likely to prove more powerful 
that any Strasbourg jurisprudence for keeping some families in regular and affordable  visiting 
distance, and giving some individuals a chance of reintegration into their former settled life, albeit 
when residency rights trump nationality. This does, however, run counter to the universalism of 
human rights. Protections and safeguards will depend on complex and varying concepts of 
citizenship and residency allocated irregularly within the population depending on rights derived 
variously from the CTA, the GFA and the BWA. The potential difference, in some cases, can be seen 
by comparing the potential impact of EU residency rights - relevant to the country of destination as 
well as that requesting removal - with purely human rights approach in Veermäe v Sweden. This 
application was based, inter alia, on discrimination stemming from nationality that would result in a 
longer and more punitive sentence served in a more crowded and less adequate prison, with a less 
effective complaints system. It was rejected by the ECtHR, chiefly because the applicant could not be 
compared to prisoners of Finnish origin serving their sentences in Finnish prisons as prisoner transfer 
destinations were restricted to the country of nationality.171 
Perhaps criteria could be developed to indicate legitimate expectations - as a matter in England of 
administrative not only human rights law - about access to transfer? There may be a need for 
separate and more localised criteria for Ireland/ Northern Ireland. Again this is a subject were penal 
NGOs and academia could assist in the development of new transfer arrangements. 
Non-custodial alternative disposals /discriminatory incarceration 
Feeling its way cautiously (‘It is not for the Court to indicate to States the manner in which their 
criminal policy and prison system should be organised’), the ECtHR has in several cases sought by 
reliance on political dialogue at the CoE to encourage non-custodial measures designed to tackle, 
among other things, ‘the problem of prison population inflation’.172  In a similar deferential mode, 
the court has advocated prosecution discretion to avoid prosecution or the greater use of 
diversionary measures. 173 In this respect it is echoing views reached within the CoE at the end of the 
 
167 Wakefield v UK App no 15817/89 (Commission Decision, 1 October 1990). 
168 X. v.UK App no. 9054/80 (Commission Decision, 8 October 1982). 
169 Zhernin v. Poland (n 106) [32]. 
170 I.N/Ruska Federacija (n 46).    
171 Veermäe v Sweden (n 158). 
172 Varga and Others v Hungary (n 123) [105], citing Rec (1999) 22 and Rec  (2006) 13 of the Committee of 
Ministers; see also Torreggiani  (n 123) [22 and 95]; and Neshkov and others v Bulgaria App nos. 36925/10, 
21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13 (ECtHR 27 January 2015). 
173Neshkov (n 172)  [10], citing  Rec (87) 18.   




last century and directly relevant to the first two categories of complaint considered in this section: 
building new prisons alone cannot resolve penal problems.174 
The UK Government’s lack of interest in the continuation of MLR financial penalty enforcement and 
its failure to look again at MLR alternative penalty enforcement is incompatible with its stated 
enthusiasm for prisoner transfer to assist rehabilitation or resettlement. Collaborative work on 
sentence equivalence could be extended to equivalence issues for these two forms of cooperation. A 
modest restoration of the AFJS financial penalties MLR enforcement would probably pay for the 
entire work programme envisaged here within a very short time. 
Conclusions  
The results of the analysis in this article and the recommendations about policy development made 
in the previous section are consistent with a proposition advanced by Feldman:  
‘.. the beneficial effect of human rights on public decision-making does not depend on 
judges. Using human rights is something that politicians, parliaments and public servants can 
and should do for themselves, for their own benefit and that of the democratic process, 
regardless of anything the judges may be doing in parallel to them.’175 
The UK Government’s prisoner transfer objective is very welcome. It will come to nothing, however, 
unless Conservative governments in Westminster emancipate themselves from long-standing 
misrepresentations of the impact of human rights by the most right-wing elements of their party. To 
achieve its criminal justice cooperation objectives, the UK Government must offer credible 
guarantees about future formal and institutional human rights compliance (including legal aid/ 
assistance and the direct enforcement of prisoners’ rights in domestic courts). There are no reasons 
to believe that this would assist criminal impunity. A failure by the UK Government to offer such 
undertakings, on the other hand, would very likely block the development of’ improved’ prisoner 
transfer arrangements and might destabilise extradition or prevent a return to PTC cooperation by 
Ireland with UK jurisdictions.  
The proposed human rights undertakings would mark a start in the UK context of beginning to 
address problems identified over a number of years with prisoner transfer within the EU. Many of 
the other problems would need a programme of policy development work. This could begin with the 
provision of independent and up-to-date information for the potential transferee and his/her legal 
advisers about (a) physical conditions/regime quality and (b) in-custody rehabilitation 
programmes/post-custody resettlement support in the destination state. The results of probably 
more time-consuming work on sentence equivalence to prevent a repetition of the outcome of 
O'Farrell & Ors could be introduced later into an ‘improved’ transfer process later. The equivalence 
work might be combined with a parallel and interrelated project to identify the feasibility of UK 
participation in MLR financial and alternative penalty enforcement. Given that the first of these 
arrangements has already worked to a limited extent, modest progress and relatively quick 
implementation would probably soon pay for the entire work programme. Such collaboration might 
be very positive for cross-border partnerships at all levels within the CTA. Also pooling government, 
 
174 See M Rogan ‘Minimising Prisonisation and the Harms of Custody’ in P.H.van Kempen and M Jendly (eds.), 
Overuse in the Criminal Justice system (Intersentia, Cambridge 2019) 214-215. 
175 Feldman (n 8) 97-98.  




legal and academic expertise from the four jurisdictions might help to ensure a greater degree of 
common/Scots law informed policy input into tackling current and future problems in the AFJS 
acquis.176 
The proposed transferee information dossier could be deposited with the decision makers in both 
states as a matter of public record. The dossier would be a source of evidence should their decisions 
be subject to judicial or other scrutiny, such as by a statutory inspectorate. Such an initiative also has 
the potential to make a modest contribution to penal reform by giving potential transferees a more 
central role and promoting their agency (in the sense of capacity for voluntary action and some 
responsibility for transfer decisions. That aspect of an ‘improved’ prisoner transfer system, is beyond 
the scope of this article, but is an additional reason for welcoming the UK Government’s proposal. 
Politically such an initiative, if developed in the way suggested here, would signal recognition from 
Westminster that post-Brexit criminal justice cooperation with EU member states will require and 
receive constructive participation in inter-governmental/EU arrangements capable of incrementally 
improving and reducing risks arising from such processes, with progress likely to be intermittent over 
a comparatively lengthy period. 
 
Table 2: AFSJ decisions and directives directly relevant to this article together with key negotiation 
parameters and ambitions in the EU draft treaty of March 2020 
Instrument 177 (Standardised abbreviation 







EU draft treaty  
   
 
 
Commission, Draft text of the Agreement on 
the New Partnership with the United Kingdom, 
published on the UKTF website following 
Council and Parliamentary approval. 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/draft-
text-agreement-new-partnership-united-
kingdom_en > accessed 8 Auguist 2020. 
  A comprehensive dynamic and democratically 
accountable relationship: In Part 1 Title 1 
(Common Provisions) Art 2 anticipates that the 
original EU-UK treaty would be supplemented 
by later agreements that will become integral 
to the original treaty.  
Part 5 Title I (Institutional Framework) provides 
a structure for a the original relationship to be 
refined over time through a treaty structure 
that would be both dynamic and democratically 
accountable with an EU-UK co-chaired 
Partnership Council with specialised 
committees (including Law Enforcement and 
Judicial Cooperation), an EU-UK Parliamentary 
Assembly and, albeit more vague at this stage 
of drafting, civil society participation. 
Fundamental Rights Protection: In Part 1 
(Common Provisions) Title 2 (the Basis for 
Cooperation) Art 2: ‘… the Parties … [would] 
 
176 For a consideration of the future ‘fair trial’ rights implications of Brexit for Ireland as an EU common law 
jurisdiction see: L Heffernan, ‘Brexit and the Culture of EU Criminal Justice: The Influence of the Common Law 
Trial Tradition’ in this issue. 
177 Decision 2009/829/JHA mutual recognition of decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to 
provisional detention OJ L 294/20 is not considered here because this article only deals with post-conviction 
imprisonment. 
178 ‘Criminal law cooperation: Commission closes cases against Bulgaria, Greece and Ireland, after the 
complete transposition of framework decisions on criminal law’, EU business, 2 April 2020 
<https://www.eubusiness.com/topics/eulaw/infringements-apr.20 > accessed 8 July 2020. 
EU-UK relationship parameters  




reaffirm …their continued commitment to 
respect ECHR…’ 
This is further emphasised in Part 3 ( Security 
Partnership),Title I (Law Enforcement and 
Judicial Cooperation In Criminal Matters) Chap 
1, where Art.3, would reaffirm that such UK-EU 
cooperation must comply with ECHR, and, for 
the EU and its member states, CFREU. UK ECHR 
compliance and the risk of its non-compliance 
is dealt with in more detail in Chap 11 of this 
title (Other provisions) at Art 136.1-3. 
Infringement procedures and the role of the 
CJEU: Part 5 (Institutional and Horizontal 
Provisions) would allow initial negotiation and 
resolution in the Partnership Council, while 
Title 2 (Dispute Settlement) would take issues 
that prove irresolvable in the Partnership 
Council to an arbitration tribunal (created via 
the internationally neutral and highly respected 
Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague). 
Any issues of EU law are naturally reserved for 
the CJEU, but the UK Government, but not UK 
courts, would have unequivocal rights to 
initiate (indirectly) and participate (directly) in 





The European Arrest Warrant (EAW)  
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the 
European Arrest Warrant [2002] OJ L 190/1 
 
n.b. The draft treaty offers greater clarity in 
respect of legal assistance and qualified legal 
aid rights than Art11 of the Decision (limited 
to assistance in the executing state) and 
CFREU Art 47 (legal aid, but not explicitly 
stated in both states for contested surrender). 
The draft is in line with the access to legal 




√- √ Part 3 Title 1 Chap 7 (Surrender) would 
mandate MLR (with time limits) cooperation, 
subject to issues such as age of criminal 
responsibility, and optional refusal on various 
legal grounds (e.g. double criminality). Intrinsic 
prisoner rights would include: 
 (a) in penalty enforcement cases,  an executing 
state citizen, or, as recognised in CJEU case law, 
resident could be repatriated (but not 
necessarily with consent) to serve the sentence 
(Art. 80.1 (f));  
(b) in for trial cases, executing  state national or 
resident surrender could be conditional on 
repatriation equivalent to (a) (Art.83 (b); and  
(c) certain rights (intrinsic to the surrender 
measure) to legal assistance and, in trial  cases 
in both) states, legal aid in prior to surrender 
(Art 89). 
Sentenced Prisoner Transfer 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA on mutual 
recognition of custodial sentences [2008] OJ L 
327/27. 
√ Closed on 
2.4.20  
Not offered. 
Probation and Alternative Sanctions  
Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA on mutual 
recognition of probation decisions and 
alternative sanctions [2008] OJ L 337/102. 
Opted out Closed on 
2.4.20 
Not requested/offered 
Financial Penalties  
Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA on mutual 
recognition to financial penalties [2005] OJ L 
76/16  
√ Closed on 
2.4.20 
Not requested/offered 
Access to Legal Advice in Criminal and EAW 
proceedings 
Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to 
a lawyer in criminal and EAW proceedings 
[2013] OJ L 294/1. 
 
n.b.  Legal aid is available in England for EAW 
proceedings, but the UK Government has 
rejected proposals for specialist 
representation and has had to acknowledge 
that the specialist extradition court had 
Opted out Opted Out  Not requested/limited in the draft treaty to the 
surrender provisions. 
 
179 S Cras ‘The Directive on the Right to  legal aid in Criminal and EAW Proceedings’ (2017) 1 Ecrim  34-45. 
AFJS instruments directly or indirectly relevant to UK custodial cooperation negotiating aims 
 




introduced an automatic three month delay 
(breaching EAW time limits) because of the 
time taken to secure funding.180  There is an 
Irish ex gratia scheme with some legal aid 
access in EAW proceedings.181 
Legal Aid 
Directive 2016/1919/EU on legal aid for 
suspects and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings [2016] OJ L 297/1 
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